Феноменологическое истолкование логики.


J.A. Slinin


From the phenomenological point of view, only the existence of the transcendental subjectivity is apodictically necessary. When the phenomenological reduction is already carried out, the objective world being not connected with the transcendental subjectivity is found beyond the “brackets ”, and has but problematic existence. Being related to the objective world logic as well as the eidetics in a whole have the same status. Husserl follows Descartes, who considers all the truths belonging to the Mathesis Universalis as doubtful. Leibnitz’s opinion on this subject is completely different, as he hold these truths being necessary and being the essence of God, that makes them indubitable and truths in themselves.

Accordingly to Husserl, there is no logic truth, which is the truth in itself. In the “Formal and transcendental logic” he speaks of the existence of the transcendental logic and eidetics, the truths of which are related to the transcendental ego and ha\’e not problematic but apodictic character. But these truths too are not the truths in themselves. Their a priori existence is determined by the existence of my transcendental ego. It is within the transcendental subjectivity, that these truths obtain their foundation. The apodictic logic containing them Husserl manes the transcendental-solipsistic discipline.