Ситуации и смысл: не-не-фрегевская (метафорическая) логика.

Abstract

It was R. Suszko who rejected to G. Frege's postulate that all sentences have a common referent - the truth-value. Suszko sought support for his ideas in Wittgenstein while accounting the denotation of a sentence is what the sentence say about: a certain situation. The most simplified version of his Non-Fregean Logic is obtained from classical sentential calculus by adding a new identity connective which is to be used when one needs to assert the identity of situations. But approaching referents Suszko completely lay aside the third component of Fregean triangle - a sense of the sentence. In the paper (presenting the first part of the work) the system of Non-Non-Fregean (Metaphoric) Logic is proposed which allows to assert the identity of situations in some sense (similarity of situations) approaching problem from the point of view of Non-Fregean Logic .