Интенсиональная характеристика функции в логике смысла и денотата.

Abstract

In the article the question is discussed of methods of defining the intentional characteristic (concept) of function in the Alonso Church’s logic of sense and denoting. Church’s and C. A. Anderson’s offers intending to pick concepts out of all the intentional typetheoretical objects are considered as insufficient. A non-formal grounding and the main principles of the logic of sense and denoting are represented. The last is constructed as extension of the simple type theory by including of the non-type-theoretical entities. This system is aimed at the combining of semantic requirements to the intentional entities with syntactical type-theoretical variety. Intentional hierarchy is built in accordance with following principle: the concept of function is not to be reduced both to the term relations with the closest intentional entities that can 7 be resolved anymore and to their properties, but it is the function of intentional entities of the higher level.