Rationalities in conflict: compensatory logico-cognitive irrationality in interactive contexts.
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04.11.2003
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Аннотация
The aim of the article is to make a couple of steps toward a theory of conflicts between two different varieties of rationality, - namely: (i) logico-cognitive, or epistemic rationality123 and (ii) rationality, all things considered, or aggregative rationality.
The main interest of such a theory, as I perceive it, may be that, when applied to interactive contexts, it provides a basis for plausible explanations of some kinds of empirically observed irrationalities in human thought and behaviour.
1) I will begin with a brief exposition of a theory of the two rationalities. (2) Then I will construct and discuss a paradigmatic interactive situation in which for all the participants it is rational, all things considered, to jointly indulge in an epistemic irrationality, because such a choice restores Pareto-efficiency of the initially Pareto-inefficient situation. (3) Finally, I will discuss the significance and scope of possible applications of the paradigmatic model. In particular, I will argue that the paradigmatic model can provide explanations for the persistence of at least some sorts of ideologies.
The main interest of such a theory, as I perceive it, may be that, when applied to interactive contexts, it provides a basis for plausible explanations of some kinds of empirically observed irrationalities in human thought and behaviour.
1) I will begin with a brief exposition of a theory of the two rationalities. (2) Then I will construct and discuss a paradigmatic interactive situation in which for all the participants it is rational, all things considered, to jointly indulge in an epistemic irrationality, because such a choice restores Pareto-efficiency of the initially Pareto-inefficient situation. (3) Finally, I will discuss the significance and scope of possible applications of the paradigmatic model. In particular, I will argue that the paradigmatic model can provide explanations for the persistence of at least some sorts of ideologies.
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Блинов А. Rationalities in conflict: compensatory logico-cognitive irrationality in interactive contexts. // Логические исследования / Logical Investigations. 2003. Т. 10. C. 233-240.
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Литература
Bassan, В, and Scarsini, M., On the value o f information in multi-agent decision theory’, Journal o f Mathematical Economics 24, 557-576, 1995.
Blinov, A. 'Games with common belief on payoff function', Logical Investigations, Moscow: Nauka, 2001, pp.278-281.
Foley, R., The Theory o f Epistemic Rationality, Harvard University Press, 1987.
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Kamien, _. I., Tauman, Y., and Zamir, S., 'On the value o f information in a strategic conflict', Games and Economic Behavior 2, 129-153, 1990.
Kamien, _. I., Tauman, Y., and Zamir, S., 'Information transmission', in Ichiishi, T., Neyman, A., and Tauman, Y. (eds.), Game Theory and Applications, Academic Press, 273-281, 1990.
Korilis, Y. A., Lazar, A. A. and Orda, A., 'Avoiding the Braess paradox in non-cooperative networks', Journal o f Applied Probability 36, 211-222, 1999.
Komer, S., Metaphysics: Its Structure and Function, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Neyman, A. ‘Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma’, Economic Letters, 19 (1985).
Neyman, A., The positive value o f information', Games and Economic Behavior 3,350-355, 1991.
North, D. C., ‘Institutions and economics’, in Blackwell Companion to Cognitive Science, W. Bechtel and G. Graham, eds., Blackwell Publishers, 1998
Blinov, A. 'Games with common belief on payoff function', Logical Investigations, Moscow: Nauka, 2001, pp.278-281.
Foley, R., The Theory o f Epistemic Rationality, Harvard University Press, 1987.
Gossner, O., 'Comparison o f information structures’, Games and Economic Behavior, 1997.
Hirshleifer, J., The private and social value o f information and the reward to inventive activity', American Economic Review 61, 561-574, 1971.
Kamien, _. I., Tauman, Y., and Zamir, S., 'On the value o f information in a strategic conflict', Games and Economic Behavior 2, 129-153, 1990.
Kamien, _. I., Tauman, Y., and Zamir, S., 'Information transmission', in Ichiishi, T., Neyman, A., and Tauman, Y. (eds.), Game Theory and Applications, Academic Press, 273-281, 1990.
Korilis, Y. A., Lazar, A. A. and Orda, A., 'Avoiding the Braess paradox in non-cooperative networks', Journal o f Applied Probability 36, 211-222, 1999.
Komer, S., Metaphysics: Its Structure and Function, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Neyman, A. ‘Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma’, Economic Letters, 19 (1985).
Neyman, A., The positive value o f information', Games and Economic Behavior 3,350-355, 1991.
North, D. C., ‘Institutions and economics’, in Blackwell Companion to Cognitive Science, W. Bechtel and G. Graham, eds., Blackwell Publishers, 1998