Gnosticism or: How Logic Fits My Mind

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M. Kracht

Abstract

In this paper I propose a particular algorithm by means of which humans come to understand the meaning of a logical formula. This algorithm shows why it is that some formulae are intuitively easy to understand while others border on the impossible. It also shows that the natural propositional logic is intuitionistic logic, not classical logic.

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Section
Papers

References

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