Stit-logic for Imperatives

Abstract

In this paper the possibility of interpreting imperatives as sentences that are used by rational agents to impel or motivate other rational agents to act in a desired way investigates by the author. We claim that such impelling strategies, that ground practical reasoning, can be pictured formally by means of stit-logic. We introduce the basic semantical ideas of stit-logic and discuss the most acceptable way of formal representation of imperative and its corresponding impelling effect. Special attention is paid to embedded stit-formulas. We demonstrate that such formulas cannot serve as an appropriate way of imperative formalization since an agent-addressee lacks the possibility of choice, and the agent-sender becomes “omnipotent” about the future course of agent-addressee’s action. We show that this unwanted situation can be eliminated, and basic imperative properties can still be expressed with embedded stit-formulas, if different kinds of indexes are used in semantic definitions for different kind of stit-operators. Finally we put an assertion that using such formulas, evaluated with respect to different kind of indexes, leaves no room for usual paradoxes of imperative logic.