Tensed Propositions In W. Ockham’s Logic


A. O. Kopylova


This article presents the reconstruction of W. Ockham’s approach to the analysis of truth conditions of tensed propositions in order to clarify Ockham’s view and to present it in a systematic way. The article focuses on the chapter seven of the second book and chapter seventy two of the first book of the treatise $\textit{Summa Logicae}$. One of the points that makes the analysis of Ockham‘s theory of tensed and modal propositions significant is the fact that he rejected the standard scholastic tool of the analysis of modal and tensed propositions — ampliation (ampliatio). Therefore, Ockham had to create his own theory that was based on his general ideas of supposition and predication that were primarily described by him in terms of the present tense. The main aim of this article is to examine why Ockham doesn’t use traditional tool for analysis of the truth-conditions in propositions about Future and Past. In the beginning of the article there is a textual reconstruction of the chapter seven, then there is an examination of the role of subject term and predication rules in this kind of propositions. Subsequently there is a general chart of the analysis of truth conditions in tensed propositions in Ockham’s view. In the article author claims that the ground of the rejection were Ockham’s ontological interests which were presented in his debate with W. Burley. Instead of traditional disjunction Ockham suggests detachment of the two senses of proposition. This idea leads to semantic controversy. Reference to the objects in past and future cannot be reduced to the reference to objects in present. Nominalism and mental language theory leads him to these semantic decisions. DOI: 10.21146/2074-1472-2018-24-1-99-114






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