On the logics of empirical modalities

Abstract

The article considers a class of ERA-logics with the empirical modalities $\square$ (necessity) and $\lozenge$ (possibility), which characterize, respectively, statements representing empirical laws and empirical tendencies, i.e., empirical regularities. Empirical regularities are the result of JSM reasoning, which is formed by the interaction of the inductive inference rules and inference rules by analogy, as well as the procedures for abductive acceptance of hypotheses.
The ERA-logics under consideration are propositional imitation of JSM reasoning applicable to sequences of extensible fact bases of intelligent systems. A characteristic feature of ERA-logics is the application of two concepts of truth – coherent and correspondent. The application of the coherent concept of truth is due to the generation of hypotheses through the rules of inductive inference and inference by analogy. The application of the correspondent concept of truth is due to the use of an abductive inference, the acceptance of the results of which uses verification of predictions hypotheses. For this purpose, ERA-logics use the operator T: ``it is true that... ''.
In the conclusion of the article, non-finite extensions of ERA-logics are discussed, as well as their differences as logics of empirical modalities from G.H. von Wright’ M-logic of logical modalities.