A Tale of Excluding the Middle
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Опубликован:
27.05.2021
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Аннотация
he paper discusses a number of interconnected points concerning negation, truth, validity and the liar paradox. In particular, it discusses an argument for the dialetheic nature of the liar sentence which draws on Dummett’s teleological account of truth. Though one way of formulating this fails, a different way succeeds. The paper then discusses the role of the Principle of Excluded Middle in the argument, and of the thought that truth in a model should be a model of truth.
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Beall J., Priest G. A Tale of Excluding the Middle // Логические исследования / Logical Investigations. 2021. Т. 27. № 1. C. 20-30.
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Литература
Beall, 2009 – Beall, J. Spandrels of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Beall, 2017 – Beall, J. “There is no Logical Negation: True, False, Both and Neither”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 2017, Vol. 14, https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/ article/view/4025/3576.
Beall, 2018 – Beall, J. “The Simple Argument for Subclassical Logic”, Philosophical Issues, 2018, Vol. 28, pp. 30–54; reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 2018, http://www.pgrim.org/philosophersannual/past.html.
Beall, 2019 – Beall, J. “On Williamson’s New Quinean Argument Against Nonclassical Logic”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 2019, Vol. 16, https://ojs.victoria.ac. nz/ajl/article/view/5915.
Beall, 2021 – Beall, J. “Transparent Truth as a Logical Property”, to appear in The Nature of Truth: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. by M. Lynch, J. Wyatt, J. Kim, and N. Kellen, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2021.
Dummett, 1959 – Dummett, M. “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1959, Vol. 59, pp. 141–162; reprinted as ch. 1 of Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, 1978.
Dummett, 1973 – Dummett, M. Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth, 1973.
Field, 2008 – Field, H. Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Fraassen, 1966 – Fraassen, van, B.C. “Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic”, Journal of Philosophy, 1966, Vol. 63, pp. 481–495.
Kripke, 1975 – Kripke, S. “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 1975, Vol. 72, pp. 690–716.
Mortensen and Priest, 1981 – Mortensen, C., and Priest, G. “The Truth Teller Paradox”, Logique et Analyse, 1981, Vol. 95–96, pp. 381–388.
Omori and Wansing, 2017 – Omori, H., and Wansing, H. “40 Years of FDE: An Introductory Overview”, Studia Logica, 2017, Vol. 105, pp. 1021–1049.
Omori and Wansing, 2019 – New Essays on Belnap-Dunn Logic, ed. by H. Omori and H. Wansing, New York: Springer, 2019.
Parsons, 1990 – Parsons, C. “True Contradictions”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1990, Vol. 20, pp. 35–53.
Priest, 1987 – Priest, G. In Contradiction, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987; 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Priest, 2008 – Priest, G. Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: from If to Is, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Priest, 2014 – Priest, G. “Revising Logic”, The Metaphysics of Logic, ed. by P. Rush, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014, ch. 12.
Priest, 2019 – Priest, G. “Natural Deduction for Systems in the FDE Family”, pp. 279–292 of Omori and Wansing (2019).
Priest, 2020 – Priest, G. “Metatheory and Dialetheism”, Logical Investigations, 2020, Vol. 26, pp. 48–59.
Beall, 2017 – Beall, J. “There is no Logical Negation: True, False, Both and Neither”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 2017, Vol. 14, https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/ article/view/4025/3576.
Beall, 2018 – Beall, J. “The Simple Argument for Subclassical Logic”, Philosophical Issues, 2018, Vol. 28, pp. 30–54; reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 2018, http://www.pgrim.org/philosophersannual/past.html.
Beall, 2019 – Beall, J. “On Williamson’s New Quinean Argument Against Nonclassical Logic”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 2019, Vol. 16, https://ojs.victoria.ac. nz/ajl/article/view/5915.
Beall, 2021 – Beall, J. “Transparent Truth as a Logical Property”, to appear in The Nature of Truth: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. by M. Lynch, J. Wyatt, J. Kim, and N. Kellen, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2021.
Dummett, 1959 – Dummett, M. “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1959, Vol. 59, pp. 141–162; reprinted as ch. 1 of Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, 1978.
Dummett, 1973 – Dummett, M. Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth, 1973.
Field, 2008 – Field, H. Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Fraassen, 1966 – Fraassen, van, B.C. “Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic”, Journal of Philosophy, 1966, Vol. 63, pp. 481–495.
Kripke, 1975 – Kripke, S. “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 1975, Vol. 72, pp. 690–716.
Mortensen and Priest, 1981 – Mortensen, C., and Priest, G. “The Truth Teller Paradox”, Logique et Analyse, 1981, Vol. 95–96, pp. 381–388.
Omori and Wansing, 2017 – Omori, H., and Wansing, H. “40 Years of FDE: An Introductory Overview”, Studia Logica, 2017, Vol. 105, pp. 1021–1049.
Omori and Wansing, 2019 – New Essays on Belnap-Dunn Logic, ed. by H. Omori and H. Wansing, New York: Springer, 2019.
Parsons, 1990 – Parsons, C. “True Contradictions”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1990, Vol. 20, pp. 35–53.
Priest, 1987 – Priest, G. In Contradiction, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987; 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Priest, 2008 – Priest, G. Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: from If to Is, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Priest, 2014 – Priest, G. “Revising Logic”, The Metaphysics of Logic, ed. by P. Rush, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014, ch. 12.
Priest, 2019 – Priest, G. “Natural Deduction for Systems in the FDE Family”, pp. 279–292 of Omori and Wansing (2019).
Priest, 2020 – Priest, G. “Metatheory and Dialetheism”, Logical Investigations, 2020, Vol. 26, pp. 48–59.