Some Preliminary Conditions for the Creation of the “Many-Worlds Theory of Everything” and the Development of Intellectual Intuition


I.A. Karpenko


The article questions some of the classical principles of thinking based on traditional intellectual intuition. In particular, the intuitive acceptability of the requirement of consistency, of the “anything follows from a contradiction” principle, of the law of the excluded middle, and some others are under challenge.
The literature, especially logical one, devotes many studies to this problem during the 20th-21st centuries. This paper formulates a new approach based on the “many-worlds theory of everything” hypothesis which states the idea of recognizing the multiverse as an actual reality. Such a hypothesis challenges the existing approaches to scientific research, the concept and the criteria of scientific theory. It requires the rejection as counterintuitive of several traditional ideas, for example, the role of experiment in substantiating a theory.
The work proceeds from the assumption that the multiverse is an objective reality. Which of the currently widespread many-worlds models is close to reality is irrelevant to substantiate the main idea here. The only thing that matters is that such a model should result from current research in modern physics and cosmology (for example, the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, the string landscape, the chaotic inflation, and some others).
The corresponding to an accurate description of the world intellectual intuition is suggested as based on a many-worlds approach since this very approach allows to remove some unresolved problems as counterintuitive ones.
The article substantiates that paraconsistent and quantum logics can become the appropriate logical basis for such a theory as these use intuitive representations close to the actual state of the world (the fundamental structure of the world) as their basics.




Philosophical logic



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