Rethinking logical disagreements: a critique of verbalism and a normative constraints approach
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Abstract
Logical pluralism posits that various conceptions of logic can coexist, suggesting that all acceptable judgments about the validity of an argument are valid without rivalry. This view implies that disagreements between logical theories are merely verbal. Contrary to Kouri Kissel’s proposal of metalinguistic negotiation as an explanation for logical disagreements, this article challenges the notion that such disputes are purely verbal. Employing inference to the best explanation, the author argues in favor of normative restrictions on belief in premises and conclusions as a more compelling explanation for logical disagreements.
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Copyright (c) 2024 Masoud Alvand
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
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Iran National Science Foundation
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University of Isfahan
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