Переосмысление логических разногласий: критика вербализма и подход, основанный на нормативных ограничениях
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Опубликован:
06.11.2024
Ключевые слова:
логический плюрализм, металингвистические переговоры, логические разногласия, нормативность логики, вывод наилучшего объяснения
Main Article Content
Аннотация
Логический плюрализм утверждает, что различные концепции логики могут сосуществовать, предполагая, что все приемлемые суждения о достоверности аргумента действительны без соперничества. Эта точка зрения подразумевает, что разногласия между логическими теориями носят чисто словесный характер. Вопреки предложению Коури Киссела о метаязыковых переговорах в качестве объяснения логических разногласий, эта статья ставит под сомнение представление о том, что такие споры носят чисто вербальный характер. Используя вывод наилучшего объяснения, автор приводит доводы в пользу нормативных ограничений на веру в посылки и выводы как более убедительного объяснения логических разногласий.
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Как цитировать
Alvand M. Переосмысление логических разногласий: критика вербализма и подход, основанный на нормативных ограничениях // Логические исследования / Logical Investigations. 2024. Т. 30. № 2. C. 72-88.
Выпуск
Раздел
Философия и логика
Copyright (c) 2024 Masoud Alvand
Это произведение доступно по лицензии Creative Commons «Attribution-NonCommercial» («Атрибуция — Некоммерческое использование») 4.0 Всемирная.
Данные о финансировании
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Iran National Science Foundation
Номер гранта 4004481 -
University of Isfahan
Номер гранта 4004481
Литература
Beall, 2006 – Beall, J., Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.
Boghossian, 2003 – Boghossian, P. “Blind reasoning”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 2003, Vol. 77, pp. 225–248.
Caret, Kouri Kissel, 2020 – Caret, C.R., Kouri Kissel, T. “Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction”, Synthese, 2020, Vol. 198, pp. 4789–4800.
Carnap, 1937 – Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937.
Dummett, 1978 – Dummett, M. “The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic”, in: Truthand Other Enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 215–247.
Field, 2009 – Field, H. “Pluralism in Logic”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2009, Vol. 2, Is. 2, pp. 342–361.
Field, 2015 – Field, H. “What is logical validity?”, in: Foundation of logical consequence, eds. by C.R. Caret, O. Hjortland. Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 33–70.
Gentzen, 1934 – Gentzen, G. “Untersuchungen ¨uber das logische Schließen II”, Math. Zeitschrift, Vol. 39, pp. 405–431. Translated in: The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, ed. by M.E. Szabo. North Holland, 1969.
Kouri Kissel, 2019 – Kouri Kissel, T. “Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism”, Synthese, 2019, Vol. 198, pp. 4801–4812.
MacFarlane, 2004 – MacFarlane, J. “In what sense (if any) is logic normative for though?”, unpublished. For presentation at the Central Division APA. [https: //johnmacfarlane.net/normativity_of_logic.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2024]
MacFarlane, 2017 – MacFarlane, J. “Is Logic a Normative Discipline?”, Presented at Conference on the Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen. [https:// johnmacfarlane.net/normative.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2024]
Plunkett, Sundell, 2013 – Plunkett, D., Sundell, T. “Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 2013, Vol. 13, No. 23, pp. 1–37.
Plunkett, 2015 – Plunkett, D. “Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy”, Inquiry, 2015, Vol. 58, No. 7–8, pp. 828–874.
Prawitz, 1977 – Prawitz, D. “Meaning and proofs: on the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic”, Theoria, 1977, Vol. 43, pp. 2–40.
Priest, 2008 – Priest, G. An introduction to non-classical logics. Second edition. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Priest, 2016 – Priest, G. “Logical disputes and the a priori”, Princ´1pios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), 2016, Vol. 23, No. 40, pp. 30–57.
Quine, 1970 – Quine, W.V.O. Philosophy of Logic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
Read, 1988 – Read, S. Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Examination of Inference. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
Read, 2006 – Reed, S. “Monism: The One True Logic”, in: D. DeVidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical approach to philosophy: Essays in honour of Graham Solomon. Springer, 2006, pp. 193–209.
Stei, 2023 – Stei, E. Logical pluralism and Logical consequence. Cambridge university Press, 2023.
Steinberger, 2019 – Steinberger, F. “Logical pluralism and logical normativity”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 2019, Vol. 19, No. 12, pp. 1–19.
Tappolet, 1997 – Tappolet, C. “Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism about Truth Predicates”, Analysis, 1997, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 209–210.
Tarski, 1983 – Tarski, A. “On the Concept of Logical Consequence”. in: Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, ed. by J. Corcoran. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983, pp. 409–420.
Boghossian, 2003 – Boghossian, P. “Blind reasoning”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 2003, Vol. 77, pp. 225–248.
Caret, Kouri Kissel, 2020 – Caret, C.R., Kouri Kissel, T. “Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction”, Synthese, 2020, Vol. 198, pp. 4789–4800.
Carnap, 1937 – Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937.
Dummett, 1978 – Dummett, M. “The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic”, in: Truthand Other Enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 215–247.
Field, 2009 – Field, H. “Pluralism in Logic”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2009, Vol. 2, Is. 2, pp. 342–361.
Field, 2015 – Field, H. “What is logical validity?”, in: Foundation of logical consequence, eds. by C.R. Caret, O. Hjortland. Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 33–70.
Gentzen, 1934 – Gentzen, G. “Untersuchungen ¨uber das logische Schließen II”, Math. Zeitschrift, Vol. 39, pp. 405–431. Translated in: The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, ed. by M.E. Szabo. North Holland, 1969.
Kouri Kissel, 2019 – Kouri Kissel, T. “Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism”, Synthese, 2019, Vol. 198, pp. 4801–4812.
MacFarlane, 2004 – MacFarlane, J. “In what sense (if any) is logic normative for though?”, unpublished. For presentation at the Central Division APA. [https: //johnmacfarlane.net/normativity_of_logic.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2024]
MacFarlane, 2017 – MacFarlane, J. “Is Logic a Normative Discipline?”, Presented at Conference on the Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen. [https:// johnmacfarlane.net/normative.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2024]
Plunkett, Sundell, 2013 – Plunkett, D., Sundell, T. “Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 2013, Vol. 13, No. 23, pp. 1–37.
Plunkett, 2015 – Plunkett, D. “Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy”, Inquiry, 2015, Vol. 58, No. 7–8, pp. 828–874.
Prawitz, 1977 – Prawitz, D. “Meaning and proofs: on the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic”, Theoria, 1977, Vol. 43, pp. 2–40.
Priest, 2008 – Priest, G. An introduction to non-classical logics. Second edition. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Priest, 2016 – Priest, G. “Logical disputes and the a priori”, Princ´1pios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), 2016, Vol. 23, No. 40, pp. 30–57.
Quine, 1970 – Quine, W.V.O. Philosophy of Logic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
Read, 1988 – Read, S. Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Examination of Inference. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
Read, 2006 – Reed, S. “Monism: The One True Logic”, in: D. DeVidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical approach to philosophy: Essays in honour of Graham Solomon. Springer, 2006, pp. 193–209.
Stei, 2023 – Stei, E. Logical pluralism and Logical consequence. Cambridge university Press, 2023.
Steinberger, 2019 – Steinberger, F. “Logical pluralism and logical normativity”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 2019, Vol. 19, No. 12, pp. 1–19.
Tappolet, 1997 – Tappolet, C. “Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism about Truth Predicates”, Analysis, 1997, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 209–210.
Tarski, 1983 – Tarski, A. “On the Concept of Logical Consequence”. in: Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, ed. by J. Corcoran. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983, pp. 409–420.