Normative standards in logic and game theory: structural parallels

Abstract

The paper examines some structural parallels between normative standards in logic and game theory. On the one hand, the standard view holds that both logic and game theory are normative disciplines. On the other hand, their normative status remains a subject of debate. It is shown that parallel research programs have emerged within logic and game theory, each responding in different ways to questions about their normative status. First, both fields exhibit a “paradoxical consensus” regarding their standard normative frameworks — classical logical consequence (in logic) and Nash equilibrium (in game theory). This consensus is paradoxical because, while these norms are widely accepted, their shortcomings are also acknowledged: classical logic faces paradoxes, and Nash equilibrium encounters conceptual difficulties. In response, alternative programs have developed, such as non-classical logics and equilibrium refinements. Second, conflicts with empirical data from related disciplines (psychology of reasoning and behavioral economics) have led to the emergence of compromise approaches — logical models of reasoning and behavioral game theory — which seek to reconcile normative ideals with observed human behavior. Third, both logic and game theory have developed a “perspective shift” program, distinct from either strengthening or weakening norms. Instead, it demands an expanded contextual framework for defining norms. This includes logical dynamics in logic and epistemic game theory in game theory. The article also argues that the “perspective shift” program reveals a convergence between logic and game theory within a broader theory of rational agency. Moreover, the search for a compromise norm can also be seen as part of this unified theory, modeling interactions among agents with varying resource constraints.